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Abstract
The paper contributes to the living debate on the controversial eﬀects of minimum wage
policy on economic performances, focusing on its impact on ﬁrms’ location choice. The
question is investigated through a theoretical model, that incorporates features from the
new trade literature (Krugman (1991)) and the labor-market literature. In a two-country
framework, we model endogenous entry of ﬁrms under wage rigidity. In this setting, the
impact of an unilateral increase in the home country’s minimum wage is analyzed.
The policy shock is shown to have a twofold inﬂuence on the relative attractiveness of the
home country, simultaneously aﬀecting its relative cost competitiveness and the aggregate
demand addressed to ﬁrms. Both eﬀects do not necessarily go in the same direction, hence
the ﬁnal eﬀect on ﬁrms’ location decisions is ambiguous. We show that it notably depends
on the adjustments that occur on the skilled and unskilled labor markets. Our overall
results suggest that the design of labor-market policies should take into account their impact
on ﬁrms’ location decisions, if willing to evaluate their whole consequences in the national
economy.
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The impact of labor-market institutions on macroeconomic performances lies at the heart of
current debates among both economic and political circles. Debates are particularly vivid in
Europe, where countries have implemented various labor-market policies over the last decades
to cope with high levels of unemployment. In particular, as underlined by Dolado, Felgueroso &
Jimeno (2000) and Dickens, Machin & Manning (1999), there has been a considerable resurgence
of interest regarding minimum wages, which are an important feature of a large number of OECD
labor markets.1
When asking for the impact of minimum wage policies, two broad and opposite arguments
emerge. On the one hand, high minimum wages prevent ﬂexibility on the labor market, and
by raising marginal costs, lead to adverse eﬀects on labor demand and employment level, as
shown theoretically in the standard neoclassical framework (the “price competitiveness eﬀect”
hereafter). On the other hand, one major argument for minimum wage policy is tied to its role
on aggregate demand. Minimum wages help maintaining the purchasing power of low-skilled
workers, which are the labor-market segment the most vulnerable to international competition
and skill-biased technological changes.2 A high-minimum wage policy would therefore entail
an “income eﬀect” that helps sustaining aggregate demand. The debate is all the less shut
down, since the increasing degree of trade and ﬁnancial liberalization in the recent decades puts
more arguments into play. In particular, the easier mobility of production factors opens new
opportunities for ﬁrms to choose in which country to locate and produce, a dimension that is
likely to alter the aggregate performances of minimum wage policy as well. In the paper, we pay
a particular attention to this dimension, asking how minimum wage policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ location
decisions in an international setting.
Review of the vast labor-market literature devoted to minimum wage policy yields contrasted
results in terms of labor-market performances. The adverse eﬀect of minimum wage obtained
in the neoclassical model is questioned in non-competitive frameworks, as shown by Bhaskar &
To (1999) in an oligopsonistic model, Cahuc & Zylberberg (1999) in a search-equilibrium model,
Manning (1995) in an eﬃciency wage model or Cahuc & Michel (1996) in a training-enhancing
framework. The related empirical literature does not reach a clear-cut conclusion either.3 But
in any case within that strand of literature, reasoning is held for a given production structure,
thereby neglecting the key role of endogeneity in ﬁrms’ location decisions.
Contrasting with the existing literature, the present paper takes into account this latter
dimension by analyzing the impact of minimum wage policy on country’s attractiveness for
foreign investors. We investigate the question in a theoretical new trade theory framework.
Initiated by Krugman (1991)’s seminal paper, new trade theory focuses on the determinants
of production patterns and ﬁrms’ location decisions in an international setting. It identiﬁes
two major determinants ; relative production costs, and aggregate demands. This framework is
thus particularly well-suited to capture the twofold impact of minimum wage on ﬁrms’ location
choices. With respect to the new trade literature, which mostly assumes ﬂexible labor market,
the originality of the paper lies in explicitly relating labor market imperfections and endogenous
entry of ﬁrms. Dewit, Görg & Montagna (2003), Hajkova, Golub, Mizra, Nicoletti & Yoo (2003)
or Javorcik & Spatareanu (2005) empirically study the role of labor-market institutions in foreign
1As illustrated by the recent increases in the US minimum wages (in 1990, 1991, 1997), the imposition of a
minimum wage in the United Kingdom (2000) after its suppression in 1993 or recent successive rises in the French
“SMIC” over legal requirements.
2See Dolado et al. (2000) or Biscourp & Kramarz (2003)
3Papers that focus on “natural experiments” do not get any clear-cut impact of minimum wage shocks on
employment (See Card & Krueger (1994) for the US, Machin & Manning (1996) for the UK, and Dolado, Kramarz,
Machin, Manning, Margolis & Teulings (1996) in several European countries). Yet, empirical papers on individual
data most obtain a signiﬁcant (and negative) impact of minimum wage on the speciﬁc segment of low-skilled
workers (see Kramarz & Philippon (2001), Portugal & Cardoso (2006), Laroque & Salanié (1999)).
2direct investment (FDI) ﬂows, focusing on employment protection laws. This paper sheds light on
another aspect of labor-market institutions, that is minimum wage policy. On this topic, and in
the theoretical ﬁeld, Picard & Toulemonde (2001) provide a notable contribution in a model with
wage bargaining. Yet, their analysis is set in partial equilibrium, which prevents from taking
into account the income eﬀect of minimum wage policy. In a general equilibrium framework
with wage rigidity, Strauss-Kahn (2005) investigates the impact of globalization on the extent
of vertical specialization and the employment inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
Unlike this paper, we focus on horizontal FDI ﬂows in minimum wage countries, consistently
with empirical evidence suggesting that horizontal motives strongly dominate vertical ones in
explaining world-wide FDI ﬂows (Markusen & Matusz (2002)). We explicitly study the impact
of cross-country diﬀerences in minimum wage policy on location decisions.4
With respect to the labor-market literature, we deliberately choose to adopt a simple frame-
work regarding the labor-market functioning. In an otherwise competitive setting, nominal
rigidity is introduced through minimum wage constraints. Absent any agglomeration eﬀect,
these wage rigidities would be predicted to have negative aggregate eﬀects, because of their de-
pressive impact on labor demand. Conversely, in a general-equilibrium setting with endogenous
entry of ﬁrms, we show that minimum wage policy has non-trivial eﬀects. A minimum wage
increase in the domestic market is shown to have a twofold impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and location
decisions. On the one hand, it increases the relative cost of producing in the country. On the
other hand, it also aﬀects its aggregate demand. Both elements come into play regarding the
ﬁnal impact on the country’s attractiveness. Under Home Market Eﬀect, the income eﬀect may
counterbalance the competitiveness loss for national ﬁrms and maintain the country’s attrac-
tiveness. The arbitrage between both eﬀects notably depends on adjustments that occur on the
labor market and of the degree of liberalization in international trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our general framework which
incorporates the main features of the New Trade theory and wage rigidities. After solving the
model in general equilibrium, we study the impact of a rise in the domestic minimum wage on
ﬁrms’ entry decisions in Section 3. Last, Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Main assumptions
The world economy is divided in two countries, Home and Foreign, with foreign variables denoted
with a star. The domestic (foreign) country is populated with ¯ L (¯ L∗) unskilled and ¯ Q ( ¯ Q∗) skilled
workers. As standard in the literature, we assume that workers are perfectly mobile across sectors
but immobile across countries. Skilled and unskilled workers only diﬀer by their productivity
levels denoted aQ and aL, with aL < aQ. Without loss of generality, productivity levels are
assumed to be identical across countries (aL = a∗
L and aQ = a∗
Q).
The representative household in each country consumes two types of goods, a homogeneous
and a diﬀerentiated good. They are produced given a sector-speciﬁc technology using skilled
and unskilled labor. As standard in the New Trade framework, the homogeneous good (denoted
by Z) is produced under constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive environment; it is
freely traded across countries to balance the current account. As a consequence, the law of one
price holds at the world level, which makes good Z a convenient candidate to serve as numéraire.
In the following, all prices are thus expressed in terms of the homogeneous good.
4Note that our theoretical framework models entry and exit of ﬁrms between two similar countries that only
diﬀer in terms of their minimum wage policy. This allows to study the impact of minimum wages on horizontal
FDI ﬂows. On the other hand, this framework does not allow to capture the speciﬁc dimension of outsourcing
linked to the decision of shutting down one entity in a given country, to open a new one abroad.
3In the diﬀerentiated good sector, monopolistic competing ﬁrms produce for both their domes-
tic and export markets, under increasing returns to scale and costly international trade. Varieties
produced by ﬁrms operating in the Home country are deﬁned over the interval [0 ;n] and indexed
by h. Similarly, foreign varieties are deﬁned as f ∈ [0 ;n∗]. The total number of varieties in
equilibrium is endogenously determined, as well as ﬁrms’ location under free entry. Firms enter
a country as long as the production is proﬁtable, given a ﬁxed cost of producing (consisting in
F units of homogeneous good) and a variable cost that depends on skilled- and unskilled-labor
wages. As ﬁrms operate under monopolistic competition, the number of produced varieties in
equilibrium matches the number of operating ﬁrms. In other words, each active ﬁrm settles in a
single location to serve both markets.
As the exposure of the model further shows, we retain some simplifying assumptions regarding
the functioning of the labor market. Labor supply is exogenous (each worker oﬀers one unit of
labor to national ﬁrms). In each country, the labor market is perfectly competitive and should
deﬁne equilibrium wages, apart from minimum wages. However, national governments maintain
the purchasing power of workers by setting a ﬁxed minimum wage (w and w∗ units of the
numéraire good). As long as the minimum wage is binding, labor markets do not clear in
equilibrium and some workers are left unemployed.
2.1.1 Households
Within a country, all workers are assumed to belong to the same family, that includes a rep-
resentative consumer. As a result, the unemployment insurance system can be neglected from
the analysis, the redistribution from employed to unemployed workers taking place inside each
representative “family”.5 Optimal demand functions are derived at the aggregate national level,
by considering the program of the representative consumer. In the following, the domestic house-
hold’s problem is solved, results being symmetric in the foreign country.
Utility of the representative household is an increasing function of her consumption of ho-






Z 0 < µ < 1 (1)
CZ is the consumption level of the homogeneous good Z and CX is a composite good of all con-














with σ ≥ 1 the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties and c(h) (c(f)) the consumption
level of a variety produced in the home (foreign) country.
The domestic household ﬁnances her consumption expenditures using her labor revenues and
residual proﬁts she perceives as the owner of ﬁrms. The domestic household’s income I (expressed
in the numéraire good Z) thus decomposes into:
I = wQQ + wL + Π
where Q is the employment level of skilled workers and L the employment level of unskilled
workers. In the following, the minimum wage is assumed to be binding on the unskilled labor
market, while it is set below the equilibrium wage for skilled workers (i.e. wQ > w). As a
5Introducing an unemployment insurance system would not alter our results as long as it is ﬁnanced by lump-
sum taxes on employed workers. Studying its role would be relevant in a setting with endogenous labor supply
and distorsive taxes, which is left for further research.
4consequence, the labor market for skilled workers clears (Q = ¯ Q) whereas there is some positive
level of unemployment for unskilled workers (L < ¯ L). Last, Π are residual proﬁts of local ﬁrms,
equal to zero in the long run equilibrium when ﬁrms are free to enter a national market.
In this setting, the budget constraint for the representative domestic household can be ex-





p(f)c(f)df + CZ ≤ wQ ¯ Q + wL (2)
where p(h) and p(f) are equilibrium prices for varieties produced in the domestic and foreign
country respectively. The minimum wage level aﬀects aggregate demand directly through the
purchasing power of low-skilled workers and indirectly through the labor-market equilibria (i.e.
through wQ and L).
Maximizing the representative household’s consumption (1) under her budget constraint (2)

















CX, f ∈ [0;n∗] (6)








2.1.2 Firms in the homogeneous sector
The homogeneous good sector is perfectly competitive and integrated at the world level. Good Z
is produced under a constant-returns-to-scale technology combining skilled and unskilled workers.
In the domestic country, the production function is:
yZ = (aLlZ)β(aQqZ)1−β 0 < β < 1
with yZ the production of homogeneous good, obtained from qZ and lZ units of skilled and
unskilled labor. β is assumed to be identical across countries. Proﬁt maximization in that sector





















Equation (7) helps analyzing the expected eﬀects of minimum wage policy in terms of wage
dispersion. As shown by equation (7), an increase in the domestic exogenous minimum wage
level, presumably designed to sustain low-skilled workers’ purchasing power, occurs at the expense
of skilled workers, whose wage decreases in terms of numéraire. By raising the marginal cost
5of production, such a policy indeed exerts an upward pressure on the equilibrium price for
homogeneous good in the domestic country. The domestic wage for skilled workers has to decrease
to preserve the law of one price in the homogeneous good market. This perverse eﬀect on skilled
wages is consistent with empirical evidence in the labor-market literature, stressing that changes
in the minimum wage have a signiﬁcant impact on wage inequality (see Lee (1999) for evidence
on US data).
Situation in the foreign market is symmetric. As the homogeneous good market is perfectly
integrated at the world level, the price of good Z is equalized across countries in equilibrium.
Given equation (7) and its foreign counterpart, this implies the following relationship linking











2.1.3 Firms in the monopolistic sector
In the monopolistic sector, production costs can be decomposed into a ﬁxed and a variable
components. To start producing a variety, a ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of F units of homogeneous
good that implicitly deﬁnes the minimum operating proﬁt ﬁrms must achieve for the production
to be proﬁtable (see Krugman (1991)). Once entered the market, the ﬁrm faces a technological










γ > 0, 0 < α < 1
where q(h) and l(h) are the quantities of skilled and unskilled labor used as inputs in the pro-
duction of y(h) units of variety h. In this expression, α is a weighting parameter that determines
the share of value added paid to skilled workers, whereas γ measures the elasticity of substitu-
tion between skilled and unskilled labor. Both parameters have a peculiar importance, as they
determine the sensitivity of labor demand to changes in the relative cost of unskilled labor (i.e.
changes in w).
Once produced, variety h can be sold to the domestic household or exported. Shipping goods
abroad entails transportation “iceberg” costs τ à la Samuelson (1954): to sell one unit abroad,
a ﬁrm has to produce τ > 1 units because of a real loss occurring during transport.7 Let p(h)
(p∗(h)) denote the price of one unit of variety h sold in the domestic (foreign) market. The proﬁt
function of the domestic ﬁrm h is then:
π(h) = p(h)c(h) + p∗(h)c∗(h) − wl(h) − wQq(h) − F (11)
The program of diﬀerentiated producers can be decomposed into two steps. First, each ﬁrm
decides (or not) to enter the domestic or the foreign market. Second, it draws up its production
plans by optimally setting prices and quantities to produce. The program can be solved backward
by ﬁrst considering the optimization problem of ﬁrms that already entered the market.
Minimizing the total cost function yields the marginal cost of producing one unit of variety















6We ensure that the Non Full Specialization condition holds, i.e. that some positive amount of homogeneous
good is produced in each country. Skilled labor endowments are thus set below the level required to cover the
world demand of good Z.
7Given that our main focus is on location choices in the monopolistic good sector, we do not introduce such
transport costs in the homogeneous sector. Modifying this assumption would not drastically aﬀect our results as
long as the homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale.
6and the associated optimal unskilled and skilled labor demands:
l(h) = δy(h) (13)
q(h) = (1 − δ)y(h) (14)
with δ the share of unskilled workers in the domestic (foreign) marginal cost of producing the
diﬀerentiated good (δ∗ being similarly deﬁned):





0 < δ < 1
Firm h sets its prices p(h) and p∗(h) so as to maximize its proﬁt (equation (11)) given the
optimal marginal cost (12) and the demand for good h from both domestic and foreign households
(equation (5) and its foreign counterpart). In the monopolistic framework à la Dixit & Stiglitz
(1977), ﬁrms optimally set prices by applying a constant mark-up over marginal cost, multiplied
by the iceberg cost for exported goods. Respectively for domestic and foreign sales, equilibrium








MC(h) ≡ τp (16)
The situation in the foreign country is perfectly symmetric. Moreover, as ﬁrms in a given
location are confronted with the same constraints, one can suppress indexes h and f in the
following.
2.2 The general equilibrium
2.2.1 Free entry and the location of the production
To characterize the model solution, optimal demands and prices are ﬁrst used to rewrite proﬁts





















• φ ≡ τ1−σ the parameter called “freeness” of trade by Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano
& Robert-Nicoud (2005). It increases between 0 and 1 when trade barriers diminish (lower
τ) or varieties become less substitutable (higher σ),
• ρ ≡ MC/MC∗ the relative cost of producing the diﬀerentiated good in the domestic
market, that depends on relative unit labor costs for skilled and unskilled workers,
• ∆ ≡ n + n∗φρσ−1 and ∆∗ ≡ n∗ + nφρ1−σ transformations of the price indices in the
diﬀerentiated good sector.
Equations (17) and (18) deliver useful insights regarding the deep mechanisms of the model.
First, they put in evidence a “Home Market Eﬀect” in production (see Martin & Rogers (1995)):
ceteris paribus, the share of local sales in the proﬁts of monopolistic ﬁrms is higher than the
share of exports as long as trade costs are strictly positive (φ < 1). This asymmetry implies
that, every thing else equal, an increase in domestic demand (dI > 0) favors domestic ﬁrms more
7than foreign ones, leading to an increase in the relative number of ﬁrms located in the home
country. Second, a cost gap in the diﬀerentiated good sector (induced here by cross-country
diﬀerences in minimum wages) reduces relative proﬁts of ﬁrms located in the high-cost country,
thus its attractiveness. These cost and demand eﬀects are key elements in the model as their
interaction determines where ﬁrms ultimately locate in the long run.
To determine the spatial long-run equilibrium, free-entry conditions are used, that draw
proﬁts towards zero:
π = 0 and π∗ = 0 (19)
Combining the expressions for domestic and foreign ﬁrms proﬁts (17) and (18) with the zero-
proﬁt condition (19) leads to the following relation between aggregate incomes and the total
number of active ﬁrms in equilibrium:
(n + n∗)F =
µ
σ
(I + I∗) (20)
As usual in the Dixit-Stiglitz’s framework, the total amount paid to cover ﬁxed costs is propor-
tional to the world expenditure spent in the monopolistic sector.
At this point, three polar cases must be distinguished regarding the spatial distribution of
production in equilibrium:
• two corner equilibria in which the production of diﬀerentiated good is fully concentrated
in a single country (i.e. n = 0 or n∗ = 0),
• an interior equilibrium in which some varieties of the diﬀerentiated good are produced in
both countries (n > 0 and n∗ > 0).
In the interior equilibrium, operating proﬁts are equalized across countries and the relative
number of active ﬁrms in each country is:
n
n∗ =
I(1 − φρσ−1) − I∗φ(ρσ−1 − φ)
I∗(1 − φρ1−σ) − Iφ(ρ1−σ − φ)
(21)
Equation (21) underscores the previously discussed determinants of ﬁrms’ location decisions,
namely the cost and demand determinants. In the interior equilibrium, the higher domestic
demand (I/I∗), the higher the relative number of ﬁrms located in the domestic country (n/n∗), in
a convex way because of the Home Market Eﬀect. As well, the lower the relative cost of producing
diﬀerentiated goods in the Home country (ρ), the higher the relative number of domestic ﬁrms.
As shown in Appendix A.1, the interior equilibrium is only sustainable for a small enough cost
gap. Outside this interval, production is entirely concentrated in the low-cost country and the
number of active ﬁrms is simply determined by the corresponding zero-proﬁt condition. Table 1
summarizes the equilibrium pattern of production as a function of the relative cost of producing
in each country.
Table 1: Equilibrium pattern of production
Relative marg. cost ρ ρ ρ
Productive CE | IE | CE
structure n∗ = 0 | n > 0, n∗ > 0 | n = 0
CE means “Corner Equilibrium”, IE “Interior Equilibrium”;
ρ and ρ deﬁned in Appendix A.1.
82.2.2 Market equilibria
The resolution of the model is achieved considering the various market-clearing conditions:
- On the skilled labor market: As the ﬁxed minimum wage is assumed lower than the equilib-
rium wage for skilled workers (w < wQ and w∗ < w∗
Q), full employment holds in equilibrium
on that labor-market segment, hence Q = ¯ Q and Q∗ = ¯ Q∗.
- On the unskilled labor market: As long as the minimum wage is binding and endowments
large enough, it is not balanced and the eﬀective unskilled employment level in each country
(L, L∗) is determined by the optimal labor demands coming from both sectors:8
wL = wnl + wlZ = nδ(σ − 1)F + βyZ (22)
w∗L∗ = w∗n∗l∗ + w∗l∗
Z = n∗δ∗(σ − 1)F + βy∗
Z (23)
- On each of the (n+n∗) diﬀerentiated goods markets: Each ﬁrm produces the amount just
suﬃcient to cover the demand emanating from the domestic and foreign markets:
y = c + τc∗
y∗ = c∗ + τc
- On the homogenous good market: Given i) the domestic and foreign consumers’ optimal
demand (equation (4) and its foreign counterpart), and ii) the demand for good Z coming
from monopolistic ﬁrms so as to cover the ﬁxed costs, the resource constraint for the
integrated world market of good Z is:
yZ + y∗
Z = (1 − µ)(I + I∗) + (n + n∗)F
In the long-run equilibrium, national equilibrium incomes solely depend on the employment
level of skilled and unskilled workers: I = wQ ¯ Q + wL and I∗ = w∗
Q ¯ Q∗ + w∗L∗. Using the labor-
market equilibrium conditions (equations (22) and (23)), one can see that they notably depend
on the equilibrium productive pattern:
I = yZ + n(σ − 1)F (24)
I∗ = y∗
Z + n∗(σ − 1)F (25)
3 Minimum wages and the location of production
This section focuses on the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the domestic minimum wage (dw > 0)
regards the spatial distribution of ﬁrms, starting from the symmetric equilibrium. In the
symmetric equilibrium, minimum wages and labor endowments are identical across countries
(w = w∗, ¯ Q = ¯ Q∗, ¯ L = ¯ L∗). In that case, it is trivial to show that the number of ﬁrms enter-
ing each market is equalized across countries (n = n∗), as well as national incomes (I = I∗),
employment levels (L = L∗), skilled wages (wQ = w∗
Q) and the production of homogenous good
(yZ = y∗
Z). We start from the benchmark symmetric equilibrium to investigate the properties of
the model following an unilateral increase in the domestic minimum wage (dw > 0).
Analytical results are derived by diﬀerentiating the model in the speciﬁc case when unskilled
labor is only required in the production of diﬀerentiated goods (i.e. when β = 0). In that case,
production of homogenous good Z uses skilled labor only. As detailed in Appendix A.3.1, good
8The unskilled labor market is not equilibrated in the Walrasian sense and adjustment occurs through quan-
tities.
9Z’s market equilibrium condition thus implies that skilled wages are equal to the exogenous
productivity level aQized in both countries and become exogenous. This simplifying assumption
has the nice property of allowing analytical derivation of the eﬀects of a domestic minimum
wage increase on location decisions in optimum. Results are discussed in Section 3.1. However,
it also implies that minimum wage shocks do not spread into the skilled labor market, thereby
eliminating part of the story. It is thus removed in Section 3.2, which investigates the eﬀects of
a domestic minimum wage increase in the general case where β > 0.
3.1 With exogenous skilled-labor wages (β = 0)
In this section, we restrict the use of unskilled workers to the diﬀerentiated good sector and
assume the homogeneous good to be produced with skilled labor only (β = 0). Equilibrium
skilled wages (expressed in terms of numéraire) equal the productivity level of skilled workers
aQ, as shown by Z-ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order condition (equation (7) with β = 0). As a result, minimum
wage changes have no distorsive eﬀect on the remuneration of skilled workers.
To get insights about the impact of the wage shock on location decisions, the model is
diﬀerentiated around the symmetric equilibrium. In a ﬁrst step, we determine the short-run
eﬀect of the shock on the proﬁtability of ﬁrms already located in both countries (i.e. for a
given number of existing ﬁrms n, n∗). This allows to infer the long-run impact on the spatial
distribution of ﬁrms in a second step. Moreover, as the ﬁxed cost of producing is set identical
across countries, one can restrict the analysis to the impact of the wage shock onto relative
operational proﬁts, πop ≡ π + F and π∗
op ≡ π∗ + F.
Given the values for I,I∗,p,p∗,PX and P∗
X in the symmetric equilibrium, one can derive the
short-run elasticity of operating proﬁts to w in each country. As detailed in Appendix A.3, it
can be decomposed in two elements, the Price Competitiveness Eﬀect (PCE hereafter) and the





































1 + φ | {z }
IE
(27)
The Price Competitiveness Eﬀect is always negative for domestic ﬁrms and positive for foreign
ones. The Income Eﬀect may be positive or negative in both countries.
The Price Competitiveness Eﬀect may be rationalized as follows. The domestic policy shock
leads to an increase in the cost of unskilled workers. Given that skilled wages are exogenous, the
increase in w translates into an increase in the relative cost of unskilled labor (w/wQ), which
entices domestic ﬁrms to substitute skilled to low-skilled workers. Yet, as long as both types
of labor are not perfect substitutes, ﬁrms cannot fully compensate for the relative increase in
production costs. By raising the relative cost of producing in the domestic country, the wage
shock lowers price competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms relative to that of foreign ones, both on the
local and export markets. Conversely, foreign ﬁrms competitiveness on both markets beneﬁts
from the domestic policy shock. For given values of n,n∗ and starting from the symmetric















Absent any income eﬀect, the wage shock would always negatively aﬀect the relative attractive-
ness of the domestic country, as underlined by Picard & Toulemonde (2001). With free entry of
10ﬁrms, the relative increase in domestic production costs would entice a larger number of ﬁrms
to locate and produce abroad. In that respect, the relocation of ﬁrms strengthens the negative
impact of the minimum wage shock on domestic employment and production obtained in the
neo-classical framework with an exogenous number of ﬁrms.
However, operating proﬁts are also altered by aggregate demand changes in the domestic
country, leading to the Income Eﬀect.9 Every thing else equal, the domestic wage shock tends to
increase aggregate income by raising low-skilled workers’ purchasing power. Nevertheless, it also
reduces demand for low-skilled labor coming from each domestic monopolistic ﬁrm, and aggregate
unskilled labor demand as well. Besides, there is no eﬀect on the skilled labor-market segment,
given that skilled wages are left unaﬀected by the minimum wage shock in a context with full
employment. As a result, for the existing number of ﬁrms, the income eﬀect may be positive or
negative. As shown by equations (26) and (27), the (necessary and suﬃcient) condition for it to
be positive is γ < 1, that is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
should be low. If positive, the income eﬀect increases proﬁts in both countries. However, as
shown by comparing both IE terms in equations (26) and (27), the upward pressure is stronger
for local ﬁrms than for foreign ones because of the Home Market Eﬀect. Ceteris paribus, the
income eﬀect enhances the domestic country’s attractiveness in relative terms.
Short-run analysis of the changes in the proﬁts of domestic and foreign incumbents further
allows to derive the eﬀect of the wage shock on the spatial distribution of ﬁrms. As ﬁrms are free
to decide where to locate, the ultimate long-run impact on the relative number of ﬁrms located
in the home country depends on the short-run changes in proﬁts in the domestic country relative
to those in the foreign one. Namely, the minimum wage increase leads to a concentration of ﬁrms
in the domestic country if the short-run elasticity of domestic proﬁts to the wage shock is larger
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1 − φ
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IE
> 0 (28)
Every thing else equal, the price competitiveness eﬀect always beneﬁts to foreign ﬁrms, thereby
reducing the domestic country’s relative attractiveness. On the other hand, as long as the income
eﬀect is positive (γ < 1), it raises domestic attractiveness in relative terms as well because of
the home market eﬀect. If strong enough, the income eﬀect may even more than compensate for
the price competitiveness loss, in what case the relative number of ﬁrms located in the domestic
country rises when the minimum wage increases.
As shown by equation (28), the balance between the cost and demand eﬀects depends on the
parameters γ, δ, µ, and φ. Their inﬂuence goes by diﬀerent transmission channels.
• µ, γ and δ aﬀect the response of domestic income to the wage shock (dI/dw). The lower
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in the diﬀerentiated sector
(γ), the more limited the substitution of skilled to unskilled workers induced by the relative
increase in w/wQ and the stronger the income eﬀect. As well, low δ and high µ tend to
favor the income eﬀect every thing else equal.
• The size of trade barriers (φ) alters the impact of a change in aggregate income on domestic
proﬁts relative to foreign ones in the short run (i.e. dπ/dI relative to dπ∗/dI). The higher
φ, i.e. the lower transport costs, the smaller the beneﬁt of being located in the market
9In the special case where skilled wages are ultimately exogenous, foreign aggregate income I
∗ remains unaf-
fected by the unilateral change in w in the short run. This will no longer be the case when β 6= 0.
10See details in Appendix A.3.
11whose national income increases.11 When international trade barriers are low (φ high),
following the domestic minimum wage shock, more ﬁrms choose to enter the foreign market
to beneﬁt from an improved price competitiveness, and to export on the domestic market
whose income has increased with the minimum wage shock.
This last result is of particular interest for economic policy design in the current context of
trade liberalization. A high-minimum wage policy is all the more likely to negatively aﬀect the
country’s relative attractiveness as international trade is free (φ high). In that case indeed, given
that skilled labor cost is unaﬀected by the minimum wage increase, pressures exerted by cost
competitiveness motives are more prevalent in the arbitrage faced by ﬁrms regarding location
choices. This result however relies on the exogeneity of skilled wages, and may accordingly be
altered when wQ adjusts to changes in w, as investigated in the next section.
3.2 With endogenous skilled wages adjustment (β 6= 0)
Analysis driven in Section 3.1 has been conducted in the particular case where skilled wages
are independent of minimum wage policy, achieved by setting β = 0. We now depart from that
assumption to take into account the potential distorsive eﬀects of minimum wage policy on the
whole remuneration structure. As shown by equation (7) when β 6= 0, an increase in w leads to
a drop in the equilibrium wage of skilled workers wQ. Endogenous adjustments of wQ alter the
impact of the wage shock on ﬁrms’ location decisions, with respect to those derived in Section
3.1.
Taking into account endogenous skilled wages adjustment is therefore likely to enrich the
analysis concerning the impact of an unilateral minimum wage increase on location decisions.
We investigate that point by relying on numerical simulations of the model, given the calibration
of structural parameters displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibration
µ α F aQ aL γ β σ τ sQ
0.55 0.53 1 1 0.86 0.7 0.4 6 1.2 0.5
The share of diﬀerentiated goods in the utility function µ is taken from Strauss-Kahn (2005).
The value for α is taken from Salanié (2000)’s estimate of the share of skilled workers in the
French value-added during the 1990s. The literature delivers contrasted results regards the value
of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. We set γ = 0.7 based on
Gianella (1999).12 The ratio aL/aQ is chosen so as to reproduce the relative productivity level
of unskilled workers observed in the data (arbitrarily setting aQ = 1).13 The value τ = 1.2 lies
within the range commonly found in the literature (see Hummels (2001) among others). The
elasticity of substitution across varieties σ = 6 corresponds to a mark-up rate of 20%, consistently
with Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) estimates. We arbitrarily set the ﬁxed cost of production
F = 1.14 The calibration of the share of unskilled labor in sector Z’s production β obeys the
11Note that the impact of the elasticity of substitution across varieties σ is ambiguous. As σ is high, competition
between ﬁrms is keener, and the negative PCE stronger. Yet it also strengthens the Home Market Eﬀect by
reducing φ, raising the (possibly positive) IE.
12Note that this calibration meets the condition for the income eﬀect to be positive in the case β = 0.
13Calibration is based on French data, using information delivered by the OECD-STAN database. Productivity
in the services sector is taken as reference for aL, whereas the productivity of skilled workers corresponds to the
productivity in total manufacturing. Reference year is 2000.
14Simulation exercises show that the value for F does not play a crucial role in our results.
12following technical requirements: i) the minimum wage level has to be higher than the unskilled
wage that would prevail in the ﬂexible case, for the constraint to be binding on the unskilled
labor market, and ii) this should not be the case on the skilled-labor market. Meeting the two
requirements (namely the second one) imposes some constraint on the calibration of β, which is
set to 0.4.15 Last, and as discussed below, the model’s predictions are sensitive to the calibrated
value of sQ ≡
¯ Q
¯ Q+¯ L, that is the share of skilled workers in the working population. In what
follows, it is set equal to 0.5, which is presumably a lower bond when considering the actual
share of minimum-wage workers in OECD countries. We check that the value could be increased
without altering qualitative results.
Given calibration summed up in Table 2, the model is simulated to study the eﬀects of an
unilateral increase in the domestic minimum wage w on optimal ﬁrms’ location decisions. Figure
1 reports the equilibrium values of n and n∗, for increasing values of w relative to w∗.16
Figure 1: Spatial impact of a domestic shock on minimum wages














In the general case with β 6= 0, one can still rationalize the impact of minimum wage policy
on the spatial distribution of ﬁrms into a price competitiveness eﬀect (PCE) and an income
eﬀect (IE). However, endogenous changes in the remuneration of skilled workers substantially
aﬀect both mechanisms. First regarding PCE, the decrease in wQ reduces domestic monopolistic
ﬁrms’ competitiveness loss induced by the minimum wage increase. Second, the Income Eﬀect
is aﬀected by the reduction in the equilibrium wage of skilled workers as well. As previously
(β = 0), the upward pressure on aggregate income induced by the increase in w is counteracted
by the decrease in unskilled employment. Besides, it is now dampened by the decrease in wQ
under full employment on the skilled labor-market segment. Every thing else equal, endogeneity
in wQ reduces the case of a positive Income Eﬀect with the policy shock.
The ﬁnal outcome is again driven by the balance between both eﬀects. Simulations show that
it is notably aﬀected by the share of skilled workers in the working population (sQ), according
to the following underlying mechanisms:
• The Income Eﬀect is all the more negative as the share of skilled workers is high. With
endogenous skilled wages, the remuneration of this labor-market segment is negatively
aﬀected by the wage shock (as shown by equation (7)). This is all the more likely to imply
a negative income eﬀect as the share of skilled workers in the working population is high.
15Precisely, we solve the program as follows. First, the model is solved without imposing any minimum wage




Q} on both unskilled and skilled labor markets (for exogenous
values of ¯ L and ¯ Q). We then impose a minimum wage level w that is 1% superior to w
E
L, checking that w < w
E
Q.
16As for the symmetric equilibrium, for each value of w departing from w
∗, we check that the model’s solution
is the interior one, and that minimum wages values are still binding as required.
13• The Price Competitiveness Eﬀect is shown to be sensitive to sQ as well. Namely, the lower
sQ, the less negative the competitiveness loss induced by the minimum-wage shock. This
is because, under decreasing marginal productivity of labor the equilibrium wage of skilled
workers decreases relatively more when the supply of skilled workers ¯ Q (hence sQ) is small.
Would the endogenous decrease in wQ be strong enough, the minimum wage shock could
even imply a positive PCE. However, simulation results suggest that this is the case for an
implausibly low share of skilled workers in the population.
For reasonable values of the parameter sQ, the PCE induced by the minimum wage shock
remains negative, and is reinforced by a negative IE. Accordingly, the minimum wage increase
reduces the domestic country’s attractiveness, as shown in Figure 1 where n/n∗ decreases all the
more since w/w∗ rises.
When wQ adjusts to changes in w, the minimum-wage shock is thus more likely to induce an
attractiveness loss for the high minimum-wage country because the positive impact on unskilled
workers’ income is partially compensated by a drop in the remuneration of skilled workers. Next
section asks how these results are aﬀected by changes in other key parameters of the model.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
Section 3.1 derives analytical conditions under which an unilateral increase in w positively inﬂu-
ences the propensity of ﬁrms to locate in the high-minimum wage country. According to equation
(28), it namely depends on i) the degree of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in
the diﬀerentiated sector (γ should be low), and ii) the size of trade costs (τ should be high). By
symmetry, this section investigates the results sensitivity to both parameters under endogenous
skilled wages.
To that aim, we simulate the model for increasing values of γ and φ and look at how it
aﬀects the relative number of ﬁrms located in the domestic country when its minimum wage is
1% higher than in the foreign country. Other structural parameters are calibrated as reported
in Table 2. Results are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis
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Sensitivity analysis to γ: We ﬁrst investigate the role of the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor in the diﬀerentiated good sector.
As displayed in the left-panel of Figure 2, the ratio n/n∗ is all the lower as γ is high. This
is consistent with our previous analytical results derived in Section 3.1, according to which the
case of an attractiveness gain for the high-minimum wage country becomes less and less likely as
skilled and unskilled workers become more substitutable. Similar mechanisms are at work with
14endogenous skilled wages. The income eﬀect is all the more negative as γ is high and the home
country’s relative attractiveness as well.
Sensitivity analysis to φ: Section 3.1 makes clear that, with exogenous skilled wages, a
increase in w all the more reduces the home country’s attractiveness as trade costs are low, i.e.
as φ is high. This is still the case when endogenous skilled wage adjustments are taken into
account, as shown by the sensitivity analysis to φ reported in the right-panel of Figure 2.
As in the case with exogenous skilled wages, the attractiveness loss of the high minimum-
wage country is all the stronger since international trade is liberalized: the ratio n/n∗ decreases
with φ. First, trade liberalization makes the cost-competitiveness of ﬁrms more prevalent in
international competition. Every thing else equal, the negative PCE induces ﬁrms to locate in
the low-cost country. Second, with endogenous skilled wages, this eﬀect is strengthened by the
negative income eﬀect in the home country. For both price-competitiveness and market potential
motives, ﬁrms are all the more enticed to settle in the foreign country as international trade is
free.
4 Conclusion
Using insights of the labor-market literature and the new trade theory, the paper contributes to
the living debate on the controversial eﬀects of labor-market policies on attractiveness for FDI.
Precisely, our theoretical framework puts into evidence the link between minimum wage policy
and the rationale behind ﬁrms’ location choices in an international setting. In that framework, we
show that the impact of a minimum wage increase on the country’s attractiveness is far from being
trivial. Firms’ location decisions are aﬀected through both the negative cost eﬀect of the wage
shock, and the possibly positive eﬀect on aggregate demand. The ﬁnal eﬀect crucially depends on
adjustments on the labor market. Precisely, we show that it depends on i) the extent to which
skilled wages adjust to minimum wage changes, ii) the magnitude of the substitution eﬀects
between skilled and unskilled workers, and iii) the share of skilled labor among workers. Namely,
when neglecting the distorsive eﬀects on the remuneration of skilled workers, the minimum
wage shock may beneﬁt to the home country in terms of attractiveness, because it increases
aggregate demand. However, for reasonable parameter values, this is no longer the case when
endogenous changes in the equilibrium wage for skilled workers are taken into account. Last, our
overall results suggest that the perverse eﬀect of a high-minimum wage policy on the country’s
attractiveness for FDI is strengthened in a world of increasing free trade. This explains the
increasing interest of political and economic circles in the question of the eﬃciency of national
labor-market institutions in a more and more globalized world.
15References
Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G. & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2005), The Footloose
Capital Model, in ‘Economic Geography and Public Choice’, Princeton University Press,
chapter 3.
Bhaskar, V. & To, T. (1999), ‘Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory
of Monopsonistic Competition’, Economic Journal 190, 190–203.
Biscourp, P. & Kramarz, F. (2003), ‘Internationalisation des entreprises industrielles et emploi:
une analyse sur la période 1986-1992’, Economie et Statistique 363-365, 60–91.
Broda, C. & Weinstein, D. E. (2006), ‘Globalization and the Gains from Variety’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121(2), 541–585.
Cahuc, P. & Michel, J. (1996), ‘Minimum Wage, Unemployment and Growth’, European Eco-
nomic Review 40, 1463–1482.
Cahuc, P. & Zylberberg, A. (1999), Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment, Tech-
nical Report 9914, CEPREMAP Working paper.
Card, D. & Krueger, A. (1994), ‘Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania Wage’, American Economic Review
84, 772–793.
Dewit, G., Görg, H. & Montagna, C. (2003), Should I Stay or Should I Go? A Note on Employ-
ment Protection, Domestic Anchorage, and FDI, IZA Discussion Papers 845, Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA).
Dickens, R., Machin, S. & Manning, A. (1999), ‘The Eﬀects of Minimum Wages on Employment:
Theory and Evidence from Britain’, Journal of Labor Economics 17(1), 1–22.
Dixit, A. & Stiglitz, J. (1977), ‘Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity’,
American Economic Review 67(3), 297–308.
Dolado, J., Felgueroso, F. & Jimeno, J. (2000), The Role of the Minimum Wage in the Welfare
State: An Appraisal, Technical Report 2452, CEPR Discussion Paper.
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Manning, A., Margolis, D. & Teulings, C. (1996), ‘The
Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe’, Economic Policy 23, 317–372.
Gianella, C. (1999), Une Estimation de l’élasticité de l’emploi Peu Qualiﬁé à son Coût, Technical
Report G9912 bis, INSEE Document de travail.
Hajkova, D., Golub, S., Mizra, D., Nicoletti, G. & Yoo, K. (2003), Policy and International
Integration: Inﬂuences on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Technical Report 356,
OECD Economic Dpt Working Paper.
Hummels, D. (2001), ‘Time as Trade Barrier’, Purdue University Working paper .
Javorcik, B. S. & Spatareanu, M. (2005), ‘Do Foreign Investors Care about Labor Market Reg-
ulations?’, Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv) 127(3), 375–403.
Kramarz, F. & Philippon, T. (2001), ‘The Impact of Diﬀerential Payroll Tax Subsidies on Min-
imum Wage Employment’, Journal of Public Economics 82, 115–46.
Krugman, P. (1991), ‘Increasing Returns and Economic Geography’, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 99(3), 483–99.
16Laroque, G. & Salanié, B. (1999), ‘Breaking Down Married Female Non-Employment in France’,
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2239.
Lee, D. (1999), ‘Wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rsising dispersion or
falling minimum wage?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 977–1023.
Machin, S. & Manning, A. (1996), ‘Employment and the Introduction of a Minimum Wage in
Great-Britain’, Economic Journal 106, 667–673.
Manning, A. (1995), ‘How Do We Know That Real Wages are Too High?’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110, 1111–1126.
Markusen, J. & Matusz, S. (2002), ‘Discriminating among Alternative Theories of the Multina-
tional Enterprise’, Review of International Economics 10(4), 694–707.
Martin, P. & Rogers, C. A. (1995), ‘Industrial location and public infrastructure’, Journal of
International Economics 39(3-4), 335–351.
Picard, P. M. & Toulemonde, E. (2001), The Impact of Labor Markets on Emergence and
Persistence of Regional Asymmetries, IZA Discussion Papers 248, Institute for the Study
of Labor (IZA).
Portugal, P. & Cardoso, A. R. (2006), ‘Disentangling the Minimum Wage Puzzle: An Analy-
sis of Worker Accessions and Separations’, Journal of the European Economic Association
4(5), 988–1013.
Salanié, B. (2000), ‘Une Maquette Analytique de Long Terme du Marché du Travail’, Economie
et Prévisions 146, 1–13.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954), ‘The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs, II: Analysis of Eﬀects of
Trade Impediments’, Economic Journal 64, 264–289.
Strauss-Kahn, V. (2005), ‘Firms Location Decision Across Asymmetric Countries and Employ-
ment Inequality’, European Economic Review 49, 299–320.
17A Appendix
A.1 The interior equilibrium
In the interior equilibrium, the relative number of ﬁrms in each country is jointly determined by
the nullity of (17) and (18) and the relative number of active ﬁrms in each country is:
n
n∗ =
I(1 − φρσ−1) − I∗φ(ρσ−1 − φ)
I∗(1 − φρ1−σ) − Iφ(ρ1−σ − φ)
This relation is only valid in the interior equilibrium, i.e. for n/n∗ > 0. It is the case if both
I(1 − φρσ−1) − I∗φ(ρσ−1 − φ) > 0 (29)
and
I∗(1 − φρ1−σ) − Iφ(ρ1−σ − φ) > 0 (30)
Manipulating equation (29) yields that:





Besides, after some calculus on equation (30), you get that:
I∗(1 − φρ1−σ) − Iφ(ρ1−σ − φ) > 0
⇔ ρσ−1 >
φ(I + I∗)
φ2I + I∗ ≡ ρ
Taken together, this means that condition (21) holds if and only if:
φ(I + I∗)
φ2I + I∗ < ρσ−1 <
I + φ2I∗
φ(I + I∗)
For this to hold, one has to ensure that it is always the case that:
φ(I + I∗)




[I + φ2I∗][φ2I + I∗] > φ2(+ + I∗)2
⇒ I∗I(1 − φ2)2 > 0





As long as ρσ−1 <
φ(I+I∗)
φ2I+I∗ , production is entirely concentrated in the domestic (low minimum
wage) country (i.e. n∗ = 0). This corner equilibrium is stable because no foreign ﬁrm has an
incentive to enter the foreign market:














φρ1−σ − (I + I∗)

which is negative, provided that ρσ−1 <
φ(I+I∗)
φ2I+I∗ .
18On the other hand, if ρσ−1 >
I+φ2I∗
φ(I+I∗), production is entirely concentrated in the foreign
country (i.e. n = 0), as the production in the domestic country is unproﬁtable:














φρσ−1 − (I + I∗)

which is negative, provided that ρσ−1 >
I+φ2I∗
φ(I+I∗).
A.2 The general equilibrium in the corner equilibrium
This section details one of the two corner equilibria, when n = 0 and n∗ > 0. The second one




the relative marginal cost is so low in the foreign country, that all ﬁrms are enticed to enter the
foreign market to produce and serve it. The number of diﬀerentiated varieties produced in the
domestic country becomes null. As a result, n = 0 while n∗ > 0.










































Z = (1 − µ)(I + I∗) + n∗F
A.3 Minimum wage shocks and location decisions under exogenous skilled
wages
A.3.1 The case of exogenous skilled wages (β = 0)
In the following, we derive analytical results in the special case where unskilled workers are only
in use in the diﬀerentiated good sector, whereas good Z is entirely produced from skilled workers.
Analytically, this is achieved by setting β equal to 0. This is a convenient case to study because
equilibrium skilled wages are then equalized across countries and insensitive to minimum wage









⇔ wQ = w∗
Q = aQ
19Moreover, as unskilled workers are only employed by diﬀerentiated good producers, labor-market
equilibria imply:
wL = nδ(σ − 1)F
w∗L∗ = n∗δ∗(σ − 1)F
with δ and δ∗ deﬁned as in the general case.
A.3.2 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, minimum wages and labor endowments are set identical across
countries (w = w∗, ¯ Q = ¯ Q∗, ¯ L = ¯ L∗). As a consequence, the number of ﬁrms entering each
market is identical in both countries, i.e. the equilibrium is an interior one. From equations
(20), (21), (24) and (25), we characterize the symmetric equilibrium as follows:
n = n∗ =
µ
σ − µ(σ − 1)δ
¯ Q
F
I = I∗ =
σ
σ − µ(σ − 1)δ
¯ Q
Q = Q∗ = ¯ Q
L = L∗ =
µ(σ − 1)δ
σ − µ(σ − 1)δ
¯ Q
w
In that case, as trade ﬂows of diﬀerentiated goods are balanced, each country produces the
quantity of homogeneous good necessary to cover the representative household’s consumption
and the ﬁxed costs paid by domestic ﬁrms:
yZ = y∗
Z = CZ + nF
A.3.3 Impact of a minimum wage shock



















we can decompose the short-term eﬀect of the wage shock on domestic ﬁrms’ operational


















































I (1 − γ)(1 − δ) =ES µδ
1+φ
σ−1
σ (1 − γ)(1 − δ)
dπop/πop





















































This allows us to derive the expression of domestic proﬁts to the domestic minimum wage
around the symmetric equilibrium:
dπop/πop
dw/w
=ES −2(σ − 1)δ
φ






which is positive if:
µ(1 − δ)(1 − γ) > σ
2φ
1 + φ
Using the same reasoning as previously, we can decompose the eﬀect of the wage shock on


















































I (1 − γ)(1 − δ) =ES µδ
1+φ
σ−1
σ (1 − γ)(1 − δ)
dπop ∗/πop ∗






















































As a result, we get:
dπop ∗/πop ∗
dw/w
=ES 2(σ − 1)δ
φ







21In the long-run, the impact of the wage shock on the country’s attractiveness is determined
by its relative eﬀect on domestic and foreign operational proﬁts. Namely, the relative number
of domestic ﬁrms increases if the elasticity of operational proﬁts to the shock is higher than the
elasticity of foreign proﬁts:
−2(σ − 1)δ
φ






> 2(σ − 1)δ
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⇔ −4(σ − 1)δ
φ
(1 + φ)2 +
σ − 1
σ




We obtain equation (28).
22